

# PROMOTING NATIONAL IDENTITY THROUGH EDUCATION: “THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL-PATRIOTIC UPBRINGING OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH” IN UKRAINE

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## Introduction

The 21st century is the century of globalization, which is uniquely defined by growing interdependence of politics, culture, ecology, and economy.<sup>1</sup> However, there are also proponents and critics of globalization, or – as David Held and Anthony McGrew call them – globalists and skeptics.<sup>2</sup> Globalists argue that globalization leads to the emergence of one integrated world where inequalities within and between societies will be diminishing and more people around the world will enjoy the fruits of technological development and modernization. In their opinion, the nation state is doomed to fade away as the new multilateral and transnational entities will replace it.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, skeptics argue that globalization brings its benefits to those already privileged, those “who are already socially and economically equipped to take advantage of the opportunities offered by economic and financial liberalization.”<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, skeptics believe in the increasing power of national cultures and identities.

Positioning himself in between of these opposing perspectives,

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<sup>1</sup> R. Cohen, P.T. Kennedy, *Thinking Globally*, [in:] R. Cohen, P.T. Kennedy (eds.), *Global Sociology*, Basingstoke 2007, pp. 44–63.

<sup>2</sup> D. Held, A.G. McGrew, *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, Malden 2000, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> T. Eriksen, *Globalization: The Key Concepts* (2nd ed.), London 2014, p. 105.

<sup>4</sup> S. Guttal, *Globalisation*, “Development in Practice” 2007, No. 17(4–5), p. 529.

Thomas Eriksen suggests that it is meaningless to argue whether a certain view on globalization is superior to another, and rather both of them provide us a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.<sup>5</sup> As he continues, it is possible to observe that interconnectedness brought by globalization increased human solidarity in questions of human rights and ecology. Nevertheless, globalization also gave space for the politics of identity based on ethnicity, religion or nationality, which potentially intensifies the fragility and isolation of societies.

In line with above mentioned findings, the recent years were characterized by increasing resistance to globalization, which has been described as a period of “post-globalization”<sup>6</sup> and the rise of identity-based politics. As Anne Applebaum states “we’re coming to the period where people want to argue over something more existential [than economics], about national identity, about who they are.”<sup>7</sup> Along with race, gender, religion or sexuality, national identity takes a firm position in the way people identify themselves these days.

At the same time, it should also be acknowledged that the state and elites have a special role in the process of national identity formation. As they seek to establish, maintain and reconstruct the notion of national identity by using the variety of available tools. In this sense, education was historically one of the main platforms to introduce and perpetuate national identity.

Since 2014, Ukraine has undergone a major political change. The revolution of 2013-2014 resulted in interaction with an already heterogeneous picture of Ukrainian social identities, thus making uneasy task of reforming country even harder. By means of different media, we could easily identify patriotic upheaval and the need for a nationwide change. Petro Poroshenko’s government took an active position in the revolution and afterward made an effort to introduce new policies aimed at building national identity, which are meant to be promoted through the country’s educational system.

This paper aims to examine how the notion of national identity is presented in the national policy act. Thus, it focuses on the case of Ukraine and “the concept of the national-patriotic upbringing of children and youth,” which was introduced in 2015 and was in force

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T. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> T. Flew, *Post-Globalisation*, “Javnost – The Public” 2018, No. 25(1–2), pp. 102–109.

<sup>7</sup> S. Croucher, *Globalization and Belonging: The Politics of Identity in a Changing World*, Lanham, Maryland 2018, p.4.

until August 2019.<sup>8</sup> In the scope of this paper, the ideological and theoretical underpinnings of nationalism will be discussed to inform on national identity building and formation through education. In the end, the Ukrainian national identity-building policy will be analyzed to observe the manifestation of nationalism in the actual education policy paper.

## National Identity: Theories and Origins

There is a lot of evidence to claim that “contemporary world is a «world of nations» and no unit claiming political sovereignty can evade the dictates of nationalism.”<sup>9</sup> In other words, despite the rising discourse of global citizenship identity and cases of symbiotic cooperation between states and international non-governmental organizations, the world is split into countries which in their overwhelming majority operate in accordance with the dictates of nationalism.

National identity is an individual's sense of affiliation to one nation. Although the definitions of a nation and nationalism were the subject of an extensive debate,<sup>10</sup> there is a general agreement that a nation can be defined as “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”<sup>11</sup> This definition comprises many important dimensions to be considered if we want to understand the phenomenon thoroughly. Political, sociological, educational and historical questions about nationalism should be asked. Therefore, it is important to understand the theoretical underpinnings and the nature of nationalism, its origins, how it functions and finally persists over time.

To start with, the way people affiliate themselves with a group and define their selves and collective identities is comprehensively presented in the social identity theory (SIT) and the social categorization the-

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015). *Koncepcija nacional'no-patriotycznego vyhovannja ditej ta molodi* [The Concept of the National-Patriotic Upbringing of Children and Youth]. Appendix to the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. No. 641.

<sup>9</sup> A.D. Smith, *State-Making and Nation-Building*, [in:] J.A. Hall (ed.), *States in History*, Oxford 1986, p. 258.

<sup>10</sup> A.D. Smith, *National identity*, London: Penguin 1991, p. 180.

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem, p. 14.

ory (SCT) introduced by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues<sup>12</sup> and further developed by John Turner.<sup>13</sup> In *The Social Identity Approach in Social Psychology*, Stephen Reicher, Russell Spears and S. Alexander Haslam provide a comprehensive overview of the key elements and implications of these theories. For instance, the SIT theory suggests that an individual's self can be defined in terms of social identity concept. In turn, the key claim of social identity is that it is individual and social simultaneously.<sup>14</sup> In other words, our self-identification is fundamentally about who we are in the world; thus, the meaning of gender, ethnicity or national identity are social artifacts which are hard to be reduced to pure individual self-identification.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, the SIT suggests that neither individual identity nor social identity can be put in the order of their importance to the subject, as both of them are unquestionably real and interdependent.<sup>16</sup> If national identity is also viewed as an instance of social identity, it should be acknowledged that social identities are about emotional attachment: "Our sense of esteem is attached to the fate of the group."<sup>17</sup> If one's group succeeds (e.g. my nation), one's self-esteem is also rising and vice versa.

In line with the SCT, national identity requires self-categorization which operates on a comparative basis. Who we are is partially defined by who we are not.<sup>18</sup> Thus, national identity is linked to one's "in-group identification" and "inter-group differentiation".<sup>19</sup> For example, "in-group identification" may sound like "I am Ukrainian", but the meaning of being Ukrainian is only complete when there is an image of the other, that is nations to compare with. Finally, what is crucial is that the SCT defines groups in cognitive terms and not as a mere aggregation of individuals' interpersonal bonds.<sup>20</sup> This feature of the SCT manifests itself in certain behavioral patterns which are unique for so-

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<sup>12</sup> H. Tajfel, M. Billig, R. Bundy, C. Flamen, *Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior*, "European Journal of Social Psychology" 1971, No. 1(2), pp. 149–178.

<sup>13</sup> H. Tajfel, J. Turner, *An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict*, [in:] W.G. Austin, S. Worchel (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Monterey, CA 1979, pp. 33–47.

<sup>14</sup> S. Reicher, R. Spears, S. Haslam, *The Social Identity Approach in Social Psychology*, [in:] M. Wetherell, C.T. Mohanty (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Identities*, Thousand Oaks, CA 2010, p. 45.

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, p. 48.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>18</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem, p. 52.

cial identity cases. For example, when acting in terms of social identity, the same group members tend to depersonalize their fellows treating them as similar to one another and tend to perceive their nature in terms of characteristics associated with the group.<sup>21</sup> In the case of national identity, it may be a statement like: "To be Ukrainian means to be hardworking, thus all or at least an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are hardworking." In connection to that, Bhikhu Parekh maintains that: "No society can function without some conception of itself, and that too plays an important part in shaping its identity."<sup>22</sup> Considering the example presented above, it may be implied that, although it is not a fact that all Ukrainians are hardworking, there is a positive national strive to be hardworking, which thus makes it reality. All in all, when drawing on the implications of these theories we may understand some important tendencies associated with nationalism. For instance, the existence of patriotism as positive emotional identification with one's nation or existence of stereotypes which picture certain nation either positively or negatively.

Yet, having set some theoretical understanding of how nationalism may operate as social identity, we should also acknowledge that nationalism as a phenomenon has its own distinct history and certain views on how it was conceived and functions up to these days. David Brown distinguishes three approaches which seek to explain the origins of nationalism and national identity. The first one is the "primordial,"<sup>23</sup> according to which the roots of the nation state are in the "pre-modern natural kinship communities,"<sup>24</sup> which are based on language or ethnic communities. The primordialist approach is often described as "cultural" or "nativist" as it claims that the nation is an ancient, natural form of human organization. Similarly, Anthony Smith suggests that modern nations descended naturally from ethnic communities,<sup>25</sup> which could be classified into three types of "ethnies" giving a pattern for nation formation: the "lateral" or aristocratic; the "vertical" or demotic; and the "fragmentary" or "immigrant."<sup>26</sup> In the first case, "aristocratic

<sup>21</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>22</sup> B. Parekh, *The Concept of National Identity*, "Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies" 1995, No. 21(2), p. 264.

<sup>23</sup> D. Brown, *Why is the Nation-State so Vulnerable to Ethnic Nationalism?*, "Nations and Nationalism" 1998, No. 4(1), p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> Ibidem, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> A.D. Smith, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Oxford 2000, p. 62.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem.

ethnies” are described as “extensive, with ragged boundaries and little social depth.”<sup>27</sup> These “ethnies” are hesitant to let ordinary people in and consider them as “theirs.”<sup>28</sup> The “lateral”<sup>29</sup> power holding “ethnies” create a centralized state which incorporates outlying lands and lower strata of people into one state with aristocratic culture. In contrast, Smith portrays the “vertical ethnies” as “intensive, with relatively compact boundaries, high barriers to entry, and deep, albeit at times uneven, cultural penetration of all classes.”<sup>30</sup> The road to nationhood here is for “indigenous intelligentsia”<sup>31</sup> to appropriate for political purposes the vernacular culture of lower strata, thus using it for mobilizing them for the creation of the ethnic nation. Finally, immigrant “ethnies” try to escape their original community for political, religious or other reasons to create a separate nation.

Following Brown’s dichotomy, the modernist theories, on the contrary, argue that the nation is first and foremost the product of industrialization and modernization processes. In line with this theory, Ernest Gellner proposes that the phenomena of the nation state and nationalism were born in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>32</sup> Throughout the Middle Ages, the mass of inhabitants living in what is now known as France or England, did not think of themselves as “French” or “English.”<sup>33</sup> As Michael Billig emphasizes, people did not often speak the same language.<sup>34</sup> For instance, when after the French Revolution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen came into the world, barely ten percent of France’s population could read it because they did not understand the language it was written in. The situation was similar in other European countries. However, it had changed in the late eighteenth century. The rapid growth of industries and modernization created a need for a literate and standardized society which could speak one language, and, what is most important, share the common sense of belonging. To put it simply, efficient industries required workforce, which could communicate and effectively live together. This led to urbanization, which in turn intensified interactions between people and stimulat-

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<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, p. 61.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem, p. 32.

<sup>32</sup> E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca 1983.

<sup>33</sup> M. Billig, *Banal nationalism*, London 1995, p. 25.

<sup>34</sup> Ibidem.

ed the need for ideological foundations to guide efficient industrial, commercial and cultural communications.

The third approach to the origins of nationalism is the constructivist one, which “sees nationalism as an ideology which was invented and employed by new political elites aspiring to power in the modern state,”<sup>35</sup> in other words, a purely political project. Benedict Anderson, one of the proponents of the constructivist approach, refers to a nation as an “imagined community” because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”<sup>36</sup> Smith summarizes that in the early 1950s communication theorists challenged the assumption of nationalists who initially thought that “the nation was «there» waiting to be discovered,”<sup>37</sup> – a conceptualization of a nation as something already existing far before eighteenth century, just not examined by scientists yet. Instead, as they proposed, “the «nation» had to be «built». Bit by bit.”<sup>38</sup> That is to say, nations as we know them now are deliberate political projects. Eventually, this approach triggers the discourse of nation-building, where state elites take a special place in the formation of national identity.

At the same time, Smith adds another perspective to this dichotomy of approaches. As Brown does it, he distinguishes the primordial theory and the modernist one, adding the third approach which seeks to combine the other two – the ethno-symbolism approach. Similarly to the modernist approach, ethno-symbolism views the nation “as active, purposive sociological communities embedded in particular historical epoch,”<sup>39</sup> but at the same time, ethno-symbolism stresses the role of ethnic communities and cultural elements, such as symbols, myths, values, memories and traditions in the creation and persistence of nation states. For instance, ethno-nationalists consider nations not merely the project of national elites. They argue that nations should have “ethno-cultural resources”<sup>40</sup> to create a persistent and solidary community which is built on these “subjective dimensions.”<sup>41</sup> The relation between the purposeful building of nations and ethno-cultural com-

<sup>35</sup> D. Brown, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>36</sup> B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London 2006, p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> A.D. Smith, *State-Making and Nation-Building*, op. cit., p. 231.

<sup>38</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>39</sup> A.D. Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*, London 2009, p. 21.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>41</sup> Ibidem.

ponents is thus “the interplay of elite proposals and majority responses, which may accept, reject or reshape those projects.”<sup>42</sup>

Having outlined theories on origins of nation states, I can surely agree with Brown and track the same idea in Smith’s writings. Although these theories differ markedly from each other in their views on the origins of nationalism, they have one feature in common – both of them recognize the role of state elites in “articulation and mobilizing the national identity.”<sup>43</sup>

### Education for national identity

Smith defines national identity as: “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of the nations, and the identification of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements.”<sup>44</sup> The heritage mentioned in this definition is something that one may reasonably assume to be the essence of a nation and thus serve as the basis for the creation of the nation state. Nevertheless, as it has already been mentioned, there is a distinctive divide between academics who study the origins of nations. These academics acknowledge a complex interplay between the elements which constitute the nation and also how, and by whom, these elements are filled with meaning. The revelation of the famous Italian politician, Massimo d’Azeglio, extends our understanding of how the nation state and nation may come to life: “We have made an Italy. Now we need to make Italians.”<sup>45</sup> Even not going deep into the debate of whether nation states were a purely political project, ethnocultural or pragmatic industrial phenomenon, it is beyond doubt that nationalism is what the state firmly and persistently promotes in various spheres of our lives.

If we want to understand how state elites made nations happen, we should first come back to the “heritage”<sup>46</sup> mentioned by Smith above. As a sum of its parts, the nation relates to historic territory, common

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<sup>42</sup> Ibidem, p. 31.

<sup>43</sup> D. Brown, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> A.D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Malden 2001, p. 18.

<sup>45</sup> E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge 1992, p. 44.

<sup>46</sup> A.D. Smith, *Nationalism...*, op. cit., p. 18.



myths, historical memories or traditions, but it does not mean that they are present when the nation is about to be built or when it already exists. By mentioning that, the concept of “invented traditions”<sup>47</sup> should be acknowledged. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger claim that myths, historical memories, and values can be invented as real, the only thing which matters is whether people believe in them. In other words, the history of a nation may be a selective depiction of facts and values or traditions may be simply invented, which as “heritage” is constructed by the ruling regime with certain purposes. This can even extend to the territory, as some nations claimed their historical right to it even if not legally possessing it at the present moment.

As a result, the portrait of the nation – whether imaginary or not – could be drawn and be a subject of “continuous reproduction and reinterpretation”<sup>48</sup> in various forms of art, symbols, ideological documents, political resolutions, and policies. In this constructed reality, education took a central stage in the formation of national identity in the age of industrialization and persists to play a key role along with the media up to these days. As a whole, national educational systems introduce and continuously reproduce standardized curriculum aiming to shape the system of values and the sense of national belonging. The most obvious examples include the study of the nation’s history, omnipresent national symbols and military courses promoting patriotism and service to the nation.

Learning about the history of the nation takes a special place in the nation-building process. Veronika Bajt elaborates on this point: “In order to create an idea of national identity and common destiny of the nation, the state power determines which version of the past is hegemonic and invests into building a shared national identity through marginalizing or removing different.”<sup>49</sup> As not being a supporter of this model, Bajt suggests that there is no sole truth and historical narrative, and multiple perspectives on historical events exist simultaneously, which in turn should be accessible for people to be considered.<sup>50</sup> Bajt’s argument certainly has a rational core as the nationalistic indoctrination may be quite dangerous as it limits people in their decision

<sup>47</sup> E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup> A.D. Smith, *Nationalism...*, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>49</sup> V. Bajt, *Nationalism from Nation to Statehood: The Emergency of Slovenia*, Saarbrücken 2010, p. 141.

<sup>50</sup> V. Bajt, *The Post-Communist Renegotiation of Slovenian National Symbols*, “Družboslovne Razprave” 2017, No. 33 (85), p. 30.

making, limits their thinking itself. The existence of the state-endorsed dominant historical perspective and the unique right of elites to shape this perspective may lead to tragic consequences.

Yet another insightful perspective is that education for national identity may shape human minds to put the nation and national interests first and foremost. This is also in line with the social identity theory which suggests that our sense of self-esteem is positively related to the fate of our group, in our case nation. While this aspect of social identity may work positively when there is a need for coordinated in-group action, there is a definite danger in how national identity defines the interest of the nation and how this interest relates to interests of other social groups, even humanity as a social group as well. It is a question to be asked: whether an individual should work, produce and create for the sake of the nation, or its actions should be globally and locally valuable. There is a definite risk of the ideology which penetrates all spheres of our lives to dominate over other perspectives and priorities.

With all pitfalls hidden in nationalism, there are surely positive trends associated with it. Smith suggests that the main goal of nation-building was to establish and maintain “national participant society.”<sup>51</sup> Thus, building a nation also meant creating a framework for collective action. In line with this kind of thinking, Dankwart Rustow argues that the consolidative national identity is a key for the process of democratic transition.<sup>52</sup> In his view, the democratization process cannot take place if the national identity issue remains unresolved. Some authors agree with Rustow suggesting that problems of national identity seriously hinder democratic reforms.<sup>53</sup> They conclude that in the case of unformed national identity only weak democracy will develop, and this will cause further deterioration of national identity and even the division of the country.

At this point, we certainly have a theoretical understanding of how, why and by whom national identity may be put forward through the medium of education. Which also makes it possible to have a deeper look at actual national identity building policy in Ukraine and ask

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<sup>51</sup> A.D. Smith, *State-Making...*, op. cit., p. 231.

<sup>52</sup> D. Rustow, *Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model*, “Comparative Politics”, No. 2(3), pp. 337–363.

<sup>53</sup> See, e.g.: M. Ottaway, *Is Democracy the Answer?*, [in:] C. Crocker, F. Hampson, P. Aall (eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, Washington 2007; T. Freyburg, S. Richter, *National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans*, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2010, No. 17(2), pp. 263–281.

some critical questions raised by theories and positions mentioned above.

## The Concept of the National-Patriotic Upbringing of Children and Youth in Ukraine

Since Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the issue of national identity was among the main challenges of the newly established state. Recent events, namely the Revolution of Dignity and military conflict with Russia in the east of Ukraine brought notable change in an already complex picture of Ukrainian national identity. For instance, Karina Korostelina brings five competing narratives of Ukrainian national identity in her interviews with Ukrainian elites. Namely, “dual identity”<sup>54</sup> recognizing equal importance of both Russian and Ukrainian cultural layers of the country; “pro-Soviet”<sup>55</sup> identity calling for appraisal of positive past; a “fight for Ukrainian identity”<sup>56</sup> emphasizing Ukrainian culture and being anti-Soviet; a “recognition of Ukrainian identity”<sup>57</sup> which in its core builds upon the difference from everything Russian; and a “multicultural-civic concept”<sup>58</sup> opposing each perspective and taking position of civic and multicultural society. The author admits that these perspectives were perceived as the zero-sum game where one should dominate over others.<sup>59</sup> In the later research, Mykola Riabchuk reveals two different types of Ukrainian national identity – European and East Slavonic, or non/anti-Soviet and post/neo-Soviet<sup>60</sup> that determine the main national divide and subsume all other divides: ethnic, linguistic, religious, social, political, regional.

Owing to various media, after 2014 we could easily encounter statements of increased “self-identification as Ukrainian, greater pride in being a citizen of the Ukrainian state, stronger attachment to symbols of nationhood, enhanced solidarity with compatriots, increased readi-

<sup>54</sup> K. Korostelina, *Mapping National Identity Narratives in Ukraine*, “Nationalities Papers” 2013, No. 41(2), p. 4.

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem, p. 7.

<sup>56</sup> Ibidem, p. 9.

<sup>57</sup> Ibidem, p. 12.

<sup>58</sup> Ibidem, p. 14.

<sup>59</sup> Ibidem, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup> M. Riabchuk, ‘Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence?, “Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism” 2015, No. 15(1), pp. 138–156.

ness to defend Ukraine or work for Ukraine, and increased confidence in the people's power to change the country for the better.”<sup>61</sup> Additionally, when explaining these changes, we may also touch upon the notion of “the «birth» of a nation”<sup>62</sup> and themes of “alienation from or even enmity towards Russia,” “consolidation of national identity [as] the result of the war” and “democratic change originated in the social mobilization against the authoritarian regime.”<sup>63</sup> To summarize, there is a clear tendency for a social change in the country, which undoubtedly should be in interaction with the national identity of Ukrainians.

The 2014 revolution in Ukraine changed power relations in the state, which resulted in a pro-European or Western shift in official state line in economic, political, social and cultural directions. As perceived by the state, the revolution also proved the need for fostering the nation-building policies in order to eliminate the existing cleavages in national identity, which in their scope contributed to the crisis that occurred in the country. Thus, leaving the new state with a task of constructing new national identity and reconsidering the nation-building process as it was done before. Under these circumstances, education took one of the major roles in the national identity formation. In order to observe and analyze how national elites in Ukraine seek to reconstruct and establish a new kind of national identity, I will take a closer look at the official education strategy for the primary and secondary schools approved by the Ministry of Education and Science (MES) of Ukraine and entitled “The Concept of the National-Patriotic Upbringing of Children and Youth.”<sup>64</sup> The act was signed in June 2015, came into force at the beginning of the 2015-2016 school year and was in force until August 2019.

As the minister of education and science of Ukraine, Sergii Kvit emphasized, the national-patriotic upbringing of children and youth is one of the major tasks of the MES of Ukraine.<sup>65</sup> At the same time, there

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<sup>61</sup> V. Kulyk, *National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and the War*, “Europe-Asia Studies” 2016, No. 68(4), p. 588.

<sup>62</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>63</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>64</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015). *Koncepcija nacional'no-patriotynogo vykhovannja ditej ta molodi* [The Concept of the National-Patriotic Upbringing of Children and Youth]. Appendix to the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. No. 641.

<sup>65</sup> Kvit S. (2015). *Natsionalno-patriotychne vykhovannja – tse odne z osnovnykh zavdan ministerstva*. [Online]. <https://mon.gov.ua/ua/news/usi-novivni-novini-2015-10-29-sergij-kvit-naczionalno-patriotichne-vixovanny> [15 October 2018].

were several similar concepts developed by the Ministry in the past, such as “The Concept of the National System of Upbringing (1996)”, “The Concept of National-Patriotic Upbringing,” “The Concept of Civic Education and Upbringing in Ukraine.”<sup>66</sup> However, in the new concept, the MES claims that none of them were deployed and materialized in concrete steps for implementation due to the change in the directions of state development and, accordingly, educational policy as well as due to the different ideas of the ruling elites about the ideology and directions of the development of education.<sup>67</sup>

To start with, the MES defines the “national-patriotic upbringing of children and youth” as the complex systematic and purposeful activity of public authorities, public organizations, families, educational institutions, and other social institutions on the formation of a high patriotic consciousness in the younger generation, a sense of loyalty, love for the motherland, caring for good of its people, readiness to fulfill the civil and constitutional duty to protect national interests, integrity, independence of Ukraine, assistance in its development as a legal, democratic and social state.<sup>68</sup> Thereby the definition encompasses many important dimensions of the process including an involvement of a broad range of stakeholders, values central to the national identity of Ukrainians and call for actions as specified by the use of action verbs. We also have a sense of extensive development of the nation-building idea through the use of two documents supplementary to the strategy: “Methodical Recommendations for National-Patriotic Upbringing at Secondary Schools,”<sup>69</sup> which guides the promotion of national identity through each school discipline in details and “Actions for Implementation of the Concept of the National-Patriotic Upbringing of Children and Youth”<sup>70</sup> assigning roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the project.

<sup>66</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015). *Koncepcija nacional'no-patriotycznego vyhovannja ditej ta molodi*, op. cit., par. 3.

<sup>67</sup> Ibidem, par. 4.

<sup>68</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>69</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015) *Metodychni rekomendacii' shhodo nacional'no-patriotycznego vyhovannja u zagal'noosvitnih navchal'nyh zakladah* [Methodical Recommendations for National-Patriotic Upbringing at Secondary Schools]. Appendix to the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. No. 641.

<sup>70</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015). *Zahody shhodo realizacii' koncepcii' nacional'no-patriotycznego vyhovannja ditej i molodi* [Actions for Implementation of the Concept of the National-Patriotic Upbringing of Children and Youth]. Appendix to the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. No. 641.

In a broad range of actions, important ideological elements and other central to the national identity notions are mentioned in the act. Three aspects seem to prevail in their extensive reference – language, history education, and military component. When the scope of this article does not allow me to examine all of them thoroughly, I can selectively concentrate on one, simultaneously drawing links to other important components.

According to Korostelina “history education plays a crucial role in the formation of the concept of the nation, especially in societies with a history of conflict, violence and mistrust among national, ethnic and religious groups.”<sup>71</sup> In regard to history education, the concept gives emphasis to the restoration of the historical memory of the long statehood traditions of Ukraine. The MES claims that the fact that Ukraine exists as a state today is the result of the millennial struggle of the Ukrainian people for their right to have their national state.<sup>72</sup> Particular importance is given to the history of the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people for state independence during the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries – the dissident movement, the OUN-UPA (the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the Revolution on Granite, the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity, etc.<sup>73</sup>

Among those historical movements, the history of the OUN-UPA is the most controversial one. While for some members of society those organizations are “the true fighters for the independence,” there are a number of studies confirming that the OUN-UPA collaborated with the Nazi Germany and were involved in the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing of Poles in western Ukraine during and after World War II.<sup>74</sup> In turn, the methodological recommendations for the high school students propose to emphasize patriotism and morality of those who fought for Ukraine’s independence. The OUN-UPA is presented as the symbol of patriotism and sacrifice.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> K. Korostelina, *Shaping Unpredictable Past: National Identity and History Education in Ukraine*, “National Identities” 2011, No. 13(1), p. 2.

<sup>72</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015). *Koncepcija nacional’no-patriotynogo vyhovannja ditej ta molodi...*, op. cit., par. 3.

<sup>73</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>74</sup> See, e.g.: I. Katchanovski, *Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide or Ukrainian-Polish Conflict? The Mass Murder of Poles by the OUN and the UPA in Volhynia*, “SSRN Electronic Journal” 2014, pp. 1–27; M. Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44*, New York 2000.

<sup>75</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015). *Metodychni rekomendacii shhodo nacional’no-patriotynogo vyhovannja...*, op. cit., p. 17.

The Revolution of Dignity should be portrayed in the educational program as a form of unprecedented in the world history peaceful collective protest of Ukrainians in response to the violation of the basic human and civil rights by a non-democratic political regime of the country.<sup>76</sup> However, this sounds like a rather biased interpretation of events that happened in 2014. For instance, Korostelina claims that the narrative of the history education at schools usually articulates the points of view and positions of the ruling party as well as supports the legitimacy of the regimes.<sup>77</sup> Presenting the Revolution of Dignity as an exclusively peaceful collective protest tends to omit the violent engagement of the far-right demonstrators during the Revolution. The dominant position of the supporters of the Maidan is that the far right was a tiny minority which did not play any significant role. However, the later study suggests that the far-right demonstrators were among the most active participants of the protests and that “neither confrontations and violence with far-right participation, nor far-right protests in general, were isolated events on the margins of the mass «peaceful and democratic» protest.”<sup>78</sup>

Moreover, the MES postulates that, when teaching about the revolution of 2013-2014, teachers must prove to students that the basic civilization values made it possible to distinguish between the world of the dictatorial values of Eurasianism and the universal values of Europe.<sup>79</sup> Such interpretation of events introduces the “wild, dictatorship East” and “civilized, democratic West” dichotomy into the school curricula. In this regard, Vishanthie Sewpaul emphasizes that there is no monolithic Eastern or Western culture and conservatism, authoritarianism or liberal views co-exist in both, the East and the West.<sup>80</sup> Although it is clear that this reference in the concept is a projection of the process of Ukraine’s integration in the European Union and further alienation from Russia, the way it is worded and put forward is rather uncritical and discriminatory in its essence.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>77</sup> K. Korostelina, *History Education and Social Identity*, “Identity” 2008, No. 8(1), pp. 25–45.

<sup>78</sup> V. Ishchenko, *Far Right Participation in the Ukrainian Maidan Protests: An Attempt of Systematic Estimation*, “European Politics and Society” 2016, No. 17(4), p. 468.

<sup>79</sup> Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. (2015). *Metodychni rekomendacii shhodo nacional'no-patriotynohogo vyhovannja...*, op. cit, p. 17.

<sup>80</sup> V. Sewpaul, *Challenging East-West Value Dichotomies and Essentialising Discourse on Culture and Social Work: Challenging East-West Dichotomies*, “International Journal of Social Welfare” 2007, No. 16(4), p. 405.



The history section also emphasizes that out of thousands of people and folks of the world, only 200 have grown up in the nation – have created their states and have achieved recognition of the world community – among them Ukraine.<sup>81</sup> They also stress the importance of recognizing oneself as Ukrainian as a representative of one of the ancient and cultural peoples of the world.<sup>82</sup> Ukrainian patriotism, according to the concept, recognizes the natural pattern of the long-term historical development of the Ukrainian nation.<sup>83</sup> These lines of the concept are of importance as they put forward historical continuity of the nation. Riad Nasser explains that:

The ability of a community to establish continuity, real or imagined, between its present generation and its ancestry, seem to be at the core of the claims put forward by a collective to its political entitlement to land and to self-determination.<sup>84</sup>

Consequently, the history of Ukraine is interpreted by the state and presented to the students with a rather limited vision of what should constitute history. As a scientific discipline, history ought to be based on research as well as the quest for a truthful depiction of facts and their critical interpretation. In this sense, Keith Crawford<sup>85</sup> and Robert Phillips<sup>86</sup> argue that the history of the nation is not an inclusive discourse of various alternatives to the nation's past, but rather a dominant group's version of the past which serves to reproduce its values and interests. In connection to this, Eric Hobsbawm puts forward an argument that what children study at school is not history but rather national traditions, myths, and values:

All human beings, collectivities and institutions need a past, but it is only occasionally the past uncovered by historical research. The standard example of an identity culture which anchors itself to the past by means of myths dressed up as history is nationalism.<sup>87</sup>

Therefore, there is always a concern that this version of the past represents the interests of those who are in power and tends to marginalize and

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<sup>81</sup> *Metodychni rekomendacii shhodo nacional'no-patriotychnoho vyhovannja...*, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>82</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>83</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>84</sup> R. Nasser, *Identity Beyond Borders: National Identity and the Post-Colonial Alternative*, "Social Semiotics" 2019, No. 29 (2), p. 153.

<sup>85</sup> K. Crawford, *A History of the Right: The Battle for Control of National Curriculum History 1989–1994*, "British Journal of Educational Studies" 1995, No. 43(4), pp. 433–456.

<sup>86</sup> R. Phillips, *Contesting the Past, Constructing the Future: History, Identity and Politics in Schools*, "British Journal of Educational Studies" 1998, No. 46(1), pp. 40–53.

<sup>87</sup> E. Hobsbawm, *On History*, London 1997, p. 270.



silence different voices. The above-mentioned examples prompt to recognize the absence of dialogue between those who adopt varying positions. Especially, when taking into account a complex nature of Ukrainian identity as documented by Korostelina, Riabchuk and discussed above. Finally, findings presented in this article may make one doubt the inclusive nature of the concept and its ability to unify the people of Ukraine.

## Conclusion

Nowadays, the majority of the developed countries have entered the stage of post-modernization or post-industrialization, whereas developing countries still opt for their industrial growth. However, the way society and economies function today is dramatically different in comparison to times when the industrial epoch started. The world experiences changes brought by globalization, such as increased interdependencies and interactions in all spheres of our lives. The purpose of nation-building to unite people and make them socially active members of a new society was a legitimate aim in the industrial past. Today societies are more culturally hybridized and not as homogeneous as they used to be. Thus, a reasonable question on the destiny of nationalism arises: Does it still satisfy the needs of humanity to act cooperatively, create and live in peace?

Education is a unique tool for human beings to develop emotionally and intellectually, help them pursue their aims to the best of their abilities and socialize. At the same time, educational systems all over the world are extensively used to promote national identity. As illustrated by the example of Ukraine, education for national identity may be constructed upon a certain historical narrative, traditions, and proclaimed national values. What is most important is the ideological underpinnings of these constructs as they guide the way society relates to its members and other nations. Thus, it is critically important to thoroughly analyze a spectrum of identities present in the country and introduce inclusive ideology capable of uniting people. Yet another concern is that the ideology of nationalism rests practically on the premise that social identity on such a massive scale should be constructed by the state and elites because by doing so it is possible to create values, polarize history or manipulate the perception of the masses. Therefore, there is an ever-growing risk that national identity building becomes not a matter of critical dialogue between various alternatives, but the

dictatorship of a dominant group's or elites' vision. Finally, when this paper focuses only on some elements of history as it is supposed to be taught in Ukrainian schools, there is still a possibility for further research which may address language of and military ideology behind the above-mentioned concepts.

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## Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest zbadanie, w jaki sposób władze państwowe promują pojęcie tożsamości narodowej poprzez politykę edukacyjną. Artykuł skupia się na przypadku Ukrainy i „konceptji wychowania narodowo-patriotycznego dzieci i młodzieży” wprowadzonej w 2015 r. W artykule zostały także poruszone kwestie ideologicznych i teoretycznych podstaw nacjonalizmu i tożsamości narodowej oraz edukacji jako narzędzia dla kształtowania tożsamości narodowej. Przypadek ukraińskiej polityki budowania tożsamości narodowej jest analizowany w celu zaobserwowania dynamiki procesów narodotwórczych w dokumencie rządowym dotyczącym polityki edukacyjnej. Sugeruje się, że podczas kreowania polityki skierowanej na kształtowanie tożsamości narodowej niezwykle ważne jest zrozumienie szeregu istniejących tożsamości.